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Abstract
The text presents compelling reflections of Pablo del Río Pereda, 
a renowned Spanish professor of Facultad de Humanidades, 
Comunicación y Documentación de la Universidad Carlos III de 
Madri, editor and reviewer (along with Amelia Álvarez) of the 
Collection Obras Escogidas by Lev Vygotsky Semienovitch, and 
president of Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje (FIA). Considered 
one of the main scholars responsible for the dissemination of 
Vygotsky’s work in the Western world, Pablo del Río is highly 
respected in the international academic scene as an expert and 
interpreter of the so-called cultural-historical psychology. Along 
this line, he has developed and coordinated major research projects 
at various universities and institutions, such as Universidad 
Complutense de Madri (Grupo GOMEL), Universidad de Salamanca 
(Centro Tecnológico de Diseño Cultural) and Fundación Infancia y 
Aprendizaje itself. He directs Laboratorio de Investigación Cultural 
(LIC) and Master Oficial Universitario en Investigación Aplicada a 
Medios de Comunicación. The interview was conducted in August 
2012. On the one hand, Pablo del Río’s account expresses his solid 
training, erudition and experience as a psychology researcher. 
On the other hand, it reveals the profile of a restless intellectual 
and critic, who is able to analyze with rigor and openness the 
vicissitudes of our time. Thus, the reflections presented here 
offer rich resources for the debate on the current challenges for 
psychology and the humanities in general.
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Resumo
O texto apresenta reflexões instigantes de Pablo del Río Pereda, 
renomado professor espanhol da Faculdade de Humanidades, 
Comunicação e Documentação da Universidade Carlos III de Madri, 
editor e revisor (em conjunto com Amelia Álvarez) da Coleção 
Obras Escogidas, de Lev Semienovitch Vigotski, e presidente da 
Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje (FIA). Considerado um dos 
principais responsáveis pela divulgação dos trabalhos de Vigotski 
no mundo ocidental, Pablo del Río é muito respeitado no cenário 
acadêmico internacional pelo fato de ser um profundo conhecedor 
e intérprete da chamada psicologia histórico-cultural. Nessa linha, 
tem desenvolvido e coordenado importantes projetos de investigação 
em diversas universidades e instituições, como a Universidade 
Complutense de Madri (Grupo GOMEL), a Universidade de 
Salamanca (Centro Tecnológico de Diseño Cultural) e a própria 
Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje. Atualmente dirige o Laboratorio 
de Investigación Cultural (LIC) e o Master Oficial Universitario en 
Investigación Aplicada a Medios de Comunicación. A entrevista foi 
realizada em agosto de 2012. Por um lado, o relato de Pablo del Río 
expressa a solidez de sua formação, sua erudição e sua experiência 
como investigador da psicologia; por outro, revela o perfil de um 
intelectual inquieto e crítico, capaz de analisar com rigor e abertura 
as vicissitudes de nosso tempo. Assim, as reflexões apresentadas 
oferecem ricos subsídios para o debate acerca dos desafios atuais da 
psicologia e das ciências humanas de modo geral.
Palavras-chave
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Born in 1944 in Spain, Pablo 
del Río Pereda has been a professor at 
Facultad de Humanidades, Comunicación y 
Documentación de la Universidad Carlos III 
de Madri since 1995. Previously, he taught 
at Universidad de Salamanca, from 1993 
to 1995, and Universidad Complutense de 
Madri, from 1976 to 1993. From the latter, 
he graduated in Philosophy, Communication 
and Psychology in 1976 and obtained his 
doctorate in Psychology in 1987. In the 
undergraduate and graduate programs, 
he teaches various subjects related to 
communication, education and psychology, 
within the interdisciplinary territory of the 
cultural psychology of human development.
One of the leading scholars responsible 
for disseminating the cultural-historical 
perspective of psychology, along with Amelia 
Álvarez, he was the editor and reviewer of Obras 
Escogidas of Lev Semienovitch Vygotsky, a 
publication that allowed many Latin American 
researchers to get in contact with the author’s 
works translated from Russian into Spanish. 
His commitment to the dissemination of the 
cultural-historical scientific thought has had 
a long history and was to some extent driven 
by the restrictions and problems of the period 
after the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, 
when he was still an undergraduate. 
Pablo del Río also has an outstanding 
work in the broader publishing field, and is 
recognized in Europe and North America. In 
1976, he set up the group Aprendizaje, once 
again with Amelia Álvarez – his companion in 
life, study and work – and with other notable 
colleagues. The group has published journals, 
books as well as diagnostic and reeducation 
tools, and initiated a nucleus of research 
on cultural development (CIEDH: Centro de 
Investigaciones sobre Educación y Desarrollo 
Humano). In 1993, the initiative became 
Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje (FIA)1, the 
institution responsible for publishing several 
periodicals – such as Infancia y Aprendizaje 
and Cultura y Educación – and important 
works of classical and contemporary authors. 
This foundation, of which Del Rio is chairman, 
conducts programs of research, production 
and publication of scientific knowledge about 
human development, with emphasis on culture, 
psychology and education. It also operates in 
vocational training and higher education, the 
organization of congresses and seminars, as 
well as in supporting scientific societies. At 
FIA, he has a program called Future Humans, 
which is dedicated to research on the changes 
in child and human development in the cultural 
contexts in transformation and on the new 
problems that accompany such changes.
The researcher was one of the founders 
of the Society for Sociocultural Research, the 
organization responsible for the dissemination 
and expansion of studies in the cultural-historical 
perspective, having worked as a member of the 
organizing committee of the congresses held in 
Madrid (1992), Geneva (1996) and Campinas 
(2000). Later, this organization merged with 
the International Society for Cultural Research 
and Activity Theory (ISCRAT), more linked 
to the epistemological and methodological 
bases of Activity Theory, giving rise to the 
International Society for Cultural and Activity 
Research (ISCAR).
1- The electronic address of Fundación Infancia y Aprendizaje is 
http://www.fia.es.
Presentation
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Over the years dedicated to research, he 
has coordinated numerous research projects 
whose purposes have always been guided 
by the following objectives: 1) to understand 
the biocultural genesis of human mind; 2) to 
perceive and empirically and theoretically 
highlight the evolutionary changes in the 
human fact nowadays and their projection into 
the future in the face of the scientific action 
and the influence of contexts and milestones 
of evolutionary development of children and 
youth, the transformation (decline, dissolution 
and sometimes preservation) of traditional 
cultures and of  the external neuropsychological 
tissue, as well as the emergence of new (physical 
and imaginary) ecologies due to the change 
in human environments; 3) to understand 
the distributed psychic architecture (internal-
external) of higher functions and develop 
means for its diagnosis (econeuropsychology) 
and for its best construction (cultural design 
and cultural educational design)2. The 
importance of such projects to the problems 
that are present nowadays in the fields of 
psychology and education can be felt through 
themes such as: audiovisual diet and its role 
in the construction of reality and imagination; 
the importance of the contexts of development 
and of children’s activities for the construction 
of attention; the effects of television diets on 
child and youth development, especially in 
relation to attention problems; the media and 
the construction of cultural identities. His 
concern is not only to detect problems caused 
by the current conditions of production, use and 
reception of media, but also to propose, in that 
environment, a strategic design of alternatives 
(DEL RIO; ÁLVAREZ; DEL RIO, 2004). According 
to the author, the directions and objectives of 
the investigations, many of them conducted in 
teams, meant facing severe funding difficulties, 
but researchers continue doing their work, 
supervising doctoral dissertations and other 
students’ research.
2 - The author himself provided by email the information on his trajectory. 
Asked about the authors and schools of 
thought that marked his education, Pablo del 
Río mentioned René Zazzo3, the master who 
introduced him to the psychology of Henri 
Wallon, marked by the approach to the person 
as a whole and the pursuit of the human being 
both in the biological and in the social sphere. 
Furthermore, according to the author, Zazzo’s 
supervision led him to consider issues ranging 
from the general problems of the diagnosis 
of human development to the uniqueness of 
people. Now his link with the cultural-historical 
school was mainly virtual and occurred 
through readings, which began by Luria’s 
work. Simultaneously, his group read and in 
some cases edited works of the Soviet scholars 
Luria, Leontiev, Elkonin, Galperin, Davidov, 
Zaporozhets, and especially Vygotsky. Later, he 
was influenced by the work of authors such as 
Heinz von Föerster,4 Von Uexküll5 and Miguel 
de Unamuno6. He also referred to scholars 
included in the tradition of the theory of drama 
and emotion, such as Calderón de la Barca7 and 
the Spanish mystics. 
His identification with the Russian great 
thinker and researcher, as well as his professional 
and academic trajectory led him to examine 
Vygotsky’s work in depth, and to contribute 
to its dissemination. In many of his writings 
and in the following interview, he examines 
the disturbing nature of such production: he 
highlights a Vygotsky more connected to art 
– especially to poetry, literature and drama – 
and a more rational Vygotsky, the scientist. 
In this sense, he uses the Platonic metaphor 
3- French psychologist (1910-1995) who worked mainly in the area of 
child psychology.
4- Austrian-American scientist (1911-2002) whose work combined physics 
and philosophy. He was one of the architects of biocybernetics and one of the 
inspirers of the complex thought, theory developed by Edgar Morin.
5- Estonian biologist (1864-1944) who, from the perspective of ecology, 
proposed the functional circle of the interaction between the organism 
and the environment, and the notion of Umwelt or subjective world of the 
perception of animals in relation to their environment.
6- Spanish philosopher (1864-1936) who suggested a narrative model 
of human life: reading oneself and writing about oneself as a novel, as a 
cultural tool to appropriating one’s own life in three levels – personal novel, 
national novel and universal novel.
7- Spanish poet and dramatist (1600-1681).
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of two horses, a white and a black one, who 
live together in conflict in the psychotechnics 
of the intellect and psychotechnics of feeling, 
uniting them as far as possible in his short life 
in the idea of  drama as a general model of the 
mind (ÁLVAREZ; DEL RÍO, 2007). Also, Del Río 
unveils an existential, historical and cultural 
Vygotsky condemned to the psychology initiated 
by him, but willingly linked to the narrative of 
humanity, facing the great questions that his 
time imposed on him.
Besides examining various Vygotskian 
concepts in depth (e.g. DEL RÍO; ÁLVAREZ, 
2007), the author proposes new concepts 
and ideas both within psychology and 
neuropsychology, and in education. His 
interesting questions about the external brain 
and neurogenesis (DEL RÍO, 1994, 2002) were 
one of the topics examined in the interview. His 
approach to education, extremely important to 
our reality,8 besides involving problems that 
plague us today – for example, those related 
to attention and the misuses of media (e.g. DEL 
RÍO, 2000; DEL RÍO, DEL RÍO, 2008; DEL RÍO, 
2010) –, addresses key issues such as the validity 
of the psychological theories of education for 
all cultures and the possibility of explaining the 
particular and the universal (DEL RÍO, 2007a, 
2007b). His idea of  education as self-evolution is 
intriguing and has roots in his ecofunctionalist 
approach and his reading of Vygotsky’s work 
under the influence of Spinoza’s thought, based 
on the idea of self-determination. In this sense, 
the author reflects on the possibility of another 
cultural design9 for the new generations, which 
implies a new curriculum, a new educational 
program for the human beings we wish to 
educate and, consequently, for a new brain.
In addition, the interview hints at a 
Pablo del Río critical of psychology and the 
humanities in their current configuration, 
8- The issues explored in the interview about his ideas and his research 
program on education will be the subject of another publication.
9- According to the author, it is the exploratory engineering of the 
human being from the perspective of a constructive cultural Vygotskian 
neuropsychology applied to the implementation of technologies that are 
cognitive and meaningful to the mind of cultures and people.
which has problems such as depersonalization, 
reductionism, the lack of dialogue between lines 
and areas of knowledge, the link to the logic of 
exact sciences and to ideology, sectarianism, and 
effectiveness and the logic of productivity at 
any cost, hard problems we face in the academy. 
Also, he is a critic of the cultural-historical 
perspective itself, questioning aspects such as 
dogmatism, orthodox Marxist readings, the lack 
of protagonism in the view of human beings, the 
lack of openness to other currents and sciences 
and the exclusivity of Vygotsky’s thought, which 
would not please the author himself.
The meeting was held one morning 
in August 2012 at the School of Education, 
University of Sao Paulo (FEUSP), during a 
break between the various academic activities 
developed by Pablo del Río in Brazil. On 
occasion, he had just finished a short journey of 
work at FEUSP10, during which he participated in 
activities as a visiting professor of the Research 
Group Pensamento e Linguagem (Thought and 
Language), based in School of Education, State 
University of Campinas (Unicamp).11
We would like to thank Ana Maria Tejada 
Mendoza and Ana Paula Carneiro Renesto, two 
doctoral students at USP who were present 
during the interview and later transcribed and 
translated the recorded material in an excellent 
way. The latter also prepared a first competent 
edition of the text. The final edition, prepared 
by us, was subsequently read and reviewed by 
the interviewee.
Finally, we would like to thank Professor 
Pablo del Río for the brief but intense time 
together. It was great to know better a man who 
is friendly, dynamic, courageous, passionate 
about what he does and who puts forth questions 
that have unfortunately been rare in our midst. 
1�- The visit of Professor Pablo del Río to FEUSP was organized by 
Professors Elizabeth Braga, Teresa Cristina Rego, Oriosvaldo Manoel de 
Moura and  Marilene Proença. It consisted of a meeting with study and 
research groups and of a lecture entitled Dissemination and timeliness of 
Lev S. Vygotsky’s legacy: contributions of Pablo del Río - Educating for the 
future: what to do today about the historical change?
11- We would like to thank Professors Ana Luiza Bustamente Smolka and 
Luci Banks-Leite for their kind invitation to share the visit.
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epistemic and objective explanatory capacity 
– to the expressive denomination which some 
Vygotskian scholars (Luria, Sacks, Cole) have 
proposed: romantic science.
I think this is a question we should 
ask about all the authors and also about 
ourselves. In Vygotsky’s case, the connections 
between life and work are very special. In 
an article published in the journal Estudos 
de Psicologia (DEL RÍO, ÁLVAREZ, 2007a), 
we analyzed this issue when discussing the 
drama of psychology and the psychology of 
drama in the Vygotskian perspective. There 
we highlighted that what is remarkable in 
Vygotsky is that he ended up electing the 
human theme as the object of his life, his 
research and his action, because it is a kind of 
tragic quest. He was very tragic and the tragic 
requires coherence, so the point from which 
he began would have made no difference. The 
end was almost defined, because he would 
not leave the problem without seeking its 
ultimate consequences. 
If we understand this, his literary decade 
(1914-1924) – prior to the psychological 
one  (1924-1934) – does not seem so 
heterogeneous or irrelevant. He started in the 
Humanities, studied Law and in the end he 
got to Psychology because he had to.  When 
the German occupation of Gomel finishes, he 
worked with Arts and Education because he had 
to teach to earn a living. Having had a very 
good education in secondary education and in 
college, he is almost conditioned to pursue this 
career, like many scholars with good training at 
that time. As it happens to so many others, 
Vygotsky became and educator. As every 
intellectual, he was passionate about education. 
He really lived education.
His first work about art (about Hamlet) 
is a very good clue to understand his vital 
relationship with psychology. Hamlet took 
him to psychology because it initiated him in 
the tragic. Vygotsky responded to Hamlet as 
to a revelation in dramatic form in the sense 
that Tolkien (1993) attributed the concept of 
We would like to thank you for your 
willingness to grant this interview. To start, 
we would like to learn a little about your 
analysis of Vygotsky’s life and work, and 
about the relation between them. In your 
opinion, what were the main motivations that 
guided Vygotsky’s research program?
It is difficult to speak about someone 
else’s motives, especially someone who is no 
longer alive and who is already part of history. 
We know, as Dobkin – a friend of Vygotsky’s 
– highlighted (1982) that one of the issues 
that most concerned him as a teenager and 
that was debated in the study circle of young 
students he took part in was the role of the 
individual in history. From this information, it 
is easy to locate two very visible strands in his 
work: a psychology with a strong materialist 
and Hegelian orientation, and another with 
strong literary and tragic root. The first one 
aims to understand and explain the historical 
and sociocultural determination of conduct 
from the social and collective tradition of the 
human being. The second aims to understand 
and explain the historical and sociocultural 
determination of personal conduct from the 
philosophical and moral tradition of self-
determination, in the wake of Spinoza , and of 
a dramatic and tragic tradition of  the human 
being, which he receives from his literary 
heritage. Vygotsky focuses his future work in 
a psychology with both types of protagonism 
(the collective and the individual ones) and 
both types of determinism (the material and 
the psychological ones) of the species in 
phylogenesis and history, and of the individual 
in an ontogenesis focused on the social and on 
the general human being, albeit in a personal 
protagonistic history. Thus, the intrinsic 
connection between his life and his work is 
radical. And monistic: the same Vygotsky seeks 
both of these things because he needs both. We 
could connect this requirement that he imposed 
on himself as a scientist – the existential 
and subjective pertinence of science, and the 
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applicability in literature, in relation to The 
Lord of the Rings. The epic or tragic work with 
existential applicability works as a vision, as 
a revelation, as a compass to guide the way to 
the vital task. A literary work is applicable if 
it is enlightening and emotionally stimulating 
to understand life. Many works in history, 
like Tolkien’s, may have been written with 
this intention of enlightenment, with the 
intention that their reading serve to guide 
the reading of the current human reality. In 
The Lord of the Rings, you see the human, 
the evil, the good and the human battle. And 
in the end, the allegory is very suggestive: 
the smallest, the simplest, are the ones who 
actually allow the epic. So Vygotsky read 
Hamlet this way, as an initiation into the 
tragic and as a revelation that his own life 
would be marked by a mission.
Not that Vygotsky identified with Hamlet. 
Hamlet is not the model, but the challenge he 
faces. The fact that a young prince is suddenly 
called by tragedy, because his father has been 
murdered, leads him to a new existential 
dimension: it is necessary to awaken from his 
intellectual life of young adventurer and face 
the fact that he can no longer live this carefree 
life. He must make committed decisions.
Vygotsky found in Hamlet the initiation 
into the tragic, the challenge of understanding 
human life as something seen from the 
consciousness, which is the consciousness 
of death. He cites the final phrase of Hamlet: 
“I die. The rest is silence.” In general, the 
challenge of the tragic has been incorporated 
into Psychology and the study of consciousness, 
because it is considered that psychology refers 
to life and not to death, to the knowable and 
not to the unknowable, which challenges us as 
a species. For the same reasons, a historical-
cultural fact as remarkable as the religious 
conduct has also been left out of science (DEL 
RÍO, ÁLVAREZ, 2007b).
Many of Vygotsky’s ideological and 
political problems proceed from this rather 
Spinozian double conviction of combining 
science’s skeptical search and the inescapable 
search for the meaning of existence. 
Throughout his life he tried to deepen the 
silence to which the end of Hamlet points. First 
he did it through philosophy and literature; 
then through science, through psychology, 
developing it jointly as a personal quest and 
as a social and historical mission.
The social commitment cannot be 
separated from the personal one; his life 
cannot be separated from his work. Personal 
feelings united with the professional and 
social senses of his mission can be summed 
up in a passage highlighted by Vygotsky in his 
study of Hamlet: “The world is mad. The time 
is out of joint!... Oh damn luck!... That I was 
born to put it in order!... “. The restlessness 
that Vygotsky found was at the same time 
existential, scientific and epistemic: nothing 
less than the understanding of the human 
being and the meaning of life.
In Hamlet, Vygotsky also found 
something else: the human fact remains 
unknowable, is a big challenge. And 
knowing where humanity is going is the 
great unknown of conscious humanity, that 
small part of humanity that cannot live 
without asking such questions. Most people 
decide not to ask them and live day to day, 
channeling their higher functions to a, say, 
practical, operatory conscience. Applying 
the capabilities of consciousness to broader 
times and larger spaces leads us to formulate 
those questions that Vygotsky asked and 
even today the effort is doomed to mystery, 
to the fact that you will not solve them, but 
you must get as far as you can. That is what 
Vygotsky did with Hamlet: on the one hand, 
he was faced with the mystery; on the other, 
he imposes on himself the challenge to accept 
the mission of putting in order as much as he 
could on the subject. So, he was condemned 
to this psychology.
How did Vygotsky perform his own role or 
character?
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What influences lead us to devote 
ourselves to the craft of thinking, the work of 
investigating? Sometimes they are direct, and 
you meet masters. Not everyone is fortunate 
to meet great masters in person, but you will 
anyway meet them virtually, through a book, 
for example; you will capture the attitude, the 
momentum behind the work. And that leads us 
to know the content and investigate further. 
Direct influences are important, but not always 
possible. I had such luck when I met René 
Zazzo. However, my access to great masters 
was enriched through books. I also received 
other great intellectual and human heritages.
As books, books are instrumental 
mediators; but as works of people books are 
also social mediators. During his life, Vygotsky 
was accompanied by two books which he took 
everywhere: Ethics and Hamlet, which, in 
turn, configured the company of Spinoza and 
Shakespeare. Thus, books bring not only new 
knowledge, but also the meaning of the human 
being, the human what for of such knowledge. 
In any authors we read, we always capture their 
characters. It is impossible for them to hide 
behind the writing, although many try to do it. 
As Unamuno used to say, there are people who 
talk like books, and there are books which talk 
like people. 
One of the things that the scientific 
rhetoric teaches us is the rhetoric of concealment. 
We should never say “I think”, but “It might be 
thought that”. And we never say “Something 
happens”. Everything is put in the passive voice, 
everything is said between quotation marks. 
This is acceptable and positive, on the one hand, 
because it shows one’s humility and care about 
the extent to which one can state something. 
But the downside is the depersonalization of 
science, which has caused a lot of harm and 
eventually removed its vital impulse. After 
all, the memory of science is the memory of 
scientists, the thought of science is the thought 
of scientists, the feeling of science is the feeling 
of scientists. And it seems that there is science 
without the subject and that science is nothing 
more than subjects’ distributed and shared 
thought.  That is, if we do psychology of science, 
we will conclude that science is nothing but a 
complex of distributed mediations, located in 
the culture, partly alive and partly inherited; 
those mediations are in the cultural memory or 
long term cultural memory, which are partially 
and occasionally incorporated into the present 
life as a living memory, as work memory, 
but which are not realized, are not activated 
without an existential community of people in 
each historical moment.
Well, if this whole process is observed 
from a Vygotskian, sociocultural perspective, 
science is a system of knowledge, but it is 
someone’s knowledge: a distributed subject 
whom an entire community shares; a culture, 
humanity. You cannot, therefore, eliminate the 
word subject of science, which is what has been 
done. In other words, in science there is still 
protagonism, not only a historical, social action, 
but also a personal action. And, using all that 
sort of disguise and concealment in the process 
of communication and scientific production, 
we end up ignoring the great questions that 
puzzle scientists, the great challenges of human 
beings. In physics, for example, I may not 
ask myself existential questions, yet everyone 
falls in love when we try to understand what 
happened with the Big Bang. And now, thanks 
to the discovery of subparticles and stuff, and 
the possibility of an understanding of the origin 
of the universe, everyone is thrilled with it. And 
why shouldn’t they be? How could we not be 
thrilled with our own origin, with our own 
destiny? This reduction that physicists have not 
done, though they have a more inert object, we 
psychologists do with an object that is so much 
more alive. Although we psychologists are in 
the face of a subject with much greater capacity 
of freedom, of existential question, we have a 
more self-limited scientific performance. 
This brings us to a statement in Vygotsky 
1929 Manuscript: “It is not thought that 
thinks: a person thinks.”
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Yes, and the subject is being left out.
The analysis of Vygotsky’s intellectual history 
and work makes us think about this dialectical 
interplay between individual protagonism 
and collective historical processes. In fact, 
someone does science, but scientific advances 
are never totally divorced from the discoveries 
in his or her broader cultural context (which 
in turn result from the commitment of a set 
of individual efforts). However, it is curious 
to note that, both in the psychology of that 
time and in the current psychology, there 
is a kind of deification of Vygotsky. In an 
autobiographical text, Luria himself calls 
Vygotsky a genius. And Vygotsky tried to 
leave this role on numerous occasions. He 
said that knowledge was always related to a 
time, a culture and a place. Could you please 
comment on this issue?
Today there seems to be a consensus in 
the academic community about the intellectual 
excellence of Vygotsky. When he was alive 
others already recognized him, and he was 
probably aware of the uniqueness of his 
thought: he exercised it trying to develop an 
intellectual leadership to drive the construction 
of a project in psychology. I think it was not 
arrogance, but the acceptance of a challenge, 
a historical role – he felt he was called by 
destiny, just like Hamlet. And because he had 
had tuberculosis since he was 17 and he knew 
he was dying, Vygotsky was vaccinated against 
presumption. He felt provoked to make the most 
progress on this great psychology challenge in 
the time he had left. 
A sense of urgency...
Yes. This issue of the relationship between 
the genius’ individual agency and collective 
agency in history is an interesting topic. Both 
collectivist and individualist narratives tend to 
propose extreme versions. On the one hand, the 
individual as the sole subject of history, which 
is read as a sequence of actions of extraordinary 
individualities; and on the other hand, history 
as the flow of collective actions determined by 
material conditions.
Looking at Vygotsky from the model 
of a history of individuals leads to converting 
him into a genius or a hero. Seeing him from 
the model of a history of collectivities leads 
to relativize his figure and assume that if he 
had not done what he did, some other scientist 
would have reached the same ideas about 
mediation or human development, such as the 
cultural development of higher functions.
As Van der Veer and Valsiner (1991) 
pointed, in addition to the merits of Vygotsky’s 
own work, it is necessary to consider a set of 
contextual circumstances that would explain 
the recent rediscovery of Vygotsky and the 
personification in him of a whole strand of 
thought which has a broader basis, in which 
various other authors whose figures are now 
less notorious participated. That is right and 
we should look at him from a view of science 
as culture and a view of history as the history 
of mentalities, as the effect of distributed 
processes that configure the historical evolution 
of the worldviews, epistemologies and mental 
architectures of communities and people.
Also, I think that in Vygotsky’s case, 
there was a concurrence of these collective 
and cultural processes of scientific thought 
and of a personal process which could hardly 
have occurred as the result of only one of 
these two histories (the individual or the 
collective one). There was an intellectual and 
existential lucidity: the ability to combine the 
rational and material determination of conduct 
with the psychological self-determination, 
i.e., personal history with collective history. 
Vygotsky did a psychology with what he also 
tried to do in history. It was not about merely 
revealing the past history of humanity from the 
perspective of science. It was about writing, 
through science, the future history of mankind. 
Rather than presuming a single and material 
determination of the past and future history, he 
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assumed the combined intervention of dramatic 
mechanisms of self-determination of human 
behaviors. So to speak, Vygotsky integrated the 
requirements of Hegel and Spinoza. The latter 
tried to take distance from delirium or from the 
anthropocentric view of the human being who 
one sees as absolutely free and independent 
from nature, making a call to the objectification 
of our material determination, to rationality. It 
is this call that meets historical materialism 
by considering man as objectively subjected 
to the evolution of matter. But the second 
Spinozian concern was to explain that, if this 
is right, human beings can and must achieve a 
certain level of consciousness in order to self-
determine, to be able to materially confront – 
but with a certain ability to act consciously and 
voluntarily – the conditionings of their material 
world. Vygotsky postulated a model to unite 
the demands of Spinoza’s and Hegel’s rational 
explanation to the psychic understanding of 
the processes of dramatic transformation of the 
soul which Spinoza sought and which Aristotle 
described in his book Poetics.
A basic element in the Vygotskian 
mediation model is the contribution of the social 
and instrumental processes to the construction 
of conscious processes, a contribution that 
he receives in large part from the tradition of 
historical materialism. But there was another 
element, which, as Jean-Paul Bronckart (2004) 
points out, led him to articulate science’s 
requirement of explanation with hermeneutics’ 
requirement of understanding. The analysis 
of subjective psychic processes that enable 
the dramatic action of inner language meets 
the second requirement; the analysis of the 
objective psychic processes that allow material 
action meet the first requirement. In this sense, 
Vygotsky characterized higher functions by their 
voluntary and determined nature. Therefore, 
in the study of these functions, he addressed 
not only the intellectual aspects (today we 
would say cognitive), but also the intentional 
and voluntary ones. Luria would investigate 
these directive processes in his experiments on 
voluntary action, adopting expressions such as 
directive function and executive function.
For me, the most characteristic feature of 
Vygotsky’s thought is the connection between 
the physical and the dramatic, the intellectual 
and the directive, the material determination 
and the mediated or poetic self-determination. 
And this unit tends to be lost in many analyzes 
of his work. Contemplating his life and work 
together allows not only perceiving him, but 
also reaching more precisely the theoretical 
heart of his proposal.
As we noted in the article already 
mentioned (DEL RÍO; ÁLVAREZ, 2007a), from 
a double quest – not only scientific, social 
and historical, but also poetic, personal and 
existential – Vygotsky sought to provide 
psychological science with self-determination, 
perhaps because, to be in agreement with its 
object (which is, at the same time, subject), 
such science must assume the entity not only 
of analyst, but also of character, of collectively 
self-determined conscience. For Vygotsky, 
psychology – rather, scientists or researcher 
psychologists – seems to be an important 
character in the historical drama with the 
maieutic task of unveiling consciousness, of 
scientifically clarifying the meaning of life and 
of illuminating the ways to create and develop 
more consciousness, in the same way art – 
rather, artists, creators – would fulfill its purpose 
trying to dramatically unveil the meaning of 
life and creating a kind of consciousness, of 
cultural operators on it.
Science tends to see its search process 
as something objective, as the history of 
knowledge, excluding the narrative processes 
of human protagonism. Nonetheless, science 
succumbs to the narrative led by heroes and 
myths, as demonstrated by Jaan Valsiner 
(1994). Although, through very absolute and 
abstract categories, we judge epochs, societies 
and distributed thought, they are always 
contingent on cultures, moments when the 
actions of individuals – particularly strategic 
and continued actions – have a role that 
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is limited, but that is sometimes deep and 
trigger of cultural processes. I think there are 
deviations in the history of ideas as well as in 
the material history of cultures and economies. 
I do not believe in a preset history following 
a scientifically and objectively described plan, 
a history with good theoretical form; nor do I 
believe that ultimately or totally and personally 
we make history, as psychology and idealist 
philosophy believed. Of course, there are 
historical conditionings, but there are choices 
and it is necessary to exercise them freely. 
By providing distributed social thought with 
intentions and models of thought and feeling 
(of mediators to change social processes 
themselves), the quest for self-determination 
and individual intentionality would have a 
real impact on collective historical processes. 
Thus, there would be a bridge to articulate 
personal protagonisms to collective ones and 
the personal transformations and asceticism to 
social transformations. Protagonism in history 
has a lot to do with the wish to exert it. As Roland 
Barthes (1986) says, “live tragically not those to 
whom life sends tragedies, but those who dare 
live them.” In other words, one must deserve 
tragedy and not just suffer it. In this sense, 
Vygotsky embraced tragedy and the challenge 
of doing a historical psychology. If he had not 
had that feeling of historical responsibility, he 
would probably have discovered the process of 
mediation, but he would not have produced this 
psychology. He would not have tried to propose 
this idea as support for reconfiguring human 
action in history.
This is a feeling (the depersonalized 
collective flow of history) that is also very 
present in the cultural-historical perspective. 
Some think that there is an orthodox cultural-
historical psychology, including a Vygotskian 
one. Personally, I do not believe there is a single, 
prescribed line of the development of the historical 
thought and cultural stages, nor a single narrative 
or a single ladder. This is a deeply antievolutionist 
thought. This does not occur in biology, so why 
should it happen in history?
In this sense, I believe that, yes, 
Vygotsky lived his character thinking that his 
ideas could be decisive, but he did it not so 
much out of arrogance but more out of a sense 
of urgency.
It is curious to note that, in Vygotsky’s 
project, there was a deliberate concern for 
integrating very different subject fields, 
areas and human dimensions, which had 
traditionally been treated separately. Do 
you think that was the basis for the new 
psychology that he aimed to build?
Yes. Let us not forget that, despite the 
drama roots and vital and existential roots, 
Vygotsky was an intellectual and a rationalist, 
someone who responded a lot to what we call 
cognitive psychology today. He was essentially 
a man of reason seeking serious explanations. 
Sometimes, this is an uncomfortable 
contradiction to accept in Vygotsky, because 
we cannot take the intellectual and scientific 
logic of reasoning and analyze his systems only 
from there, forgetting everything else. Nor can 
we take Vygotsky of the art and reject rational 
Vygotsky, because Vygotsky was extremely 
rational. Such tension is very interesting: 
Vygotsky was able to see something and its 
opposite at the same time. And still he was 
not thrown off balance; instead he fell in love. 
This is an important feature: first of openness, 
of capability for exploration; and second, the 
mission of the human as a call for consistency, 
for getting to the bottom of the issue. This 
characteristic condemned him to do psychology 
and at the same time led him, as a good 
historical materialist, to apply his psychology 
to the future history of his own society.
Maybe this is naive and arrogant, but 
Vygotsky believed that psychology could 
enlighten humanity in its evolution, in which 
he differed perhaps from most Marxists with 
whom he lived in his time, who thought the 
economy or Marxism more ideologically 
applied would illuminate the historical path. 
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Such distinction would bring profound political 
problems because psychologists tried to do 
psychologies subordinated to economic Marxism 
(I do not mean Marxism as a general model of 
historical dialectics). And he was a Marxist of 
historical dialectics in general, but he was not so 
in the sense of thinking that psychology should be 
subordinate to economy. This is a very big debate.
We know that Vygotsky had to fight the 
pressures of Marxist orthodoxy. In your view, 
are these pressures still present today?
I think they have not finished. In my 
own experience, when I met eurocommunism 
in Europe, along with many professionals 
and a number of intellectuals, I faced the 
Marxist orthodoxy. We argued that culture and 
psychology are not reducible to an ideological 
model of Marxism.
Vygotsky thought that psychology could 
enlighten us. Perhaps it could enlighten us if 
it were more concerned with the existential 
question. But psychology became very little 
existential; it lives in the mirage of the buttons, 
the mechanistic mirage whereby each thing is 
in its box and all boxes are arranged so that 
we only have to open them and unveil them 
slowly by means of research, one by one, and 
everything has already been written, is already 
fixed in the genome, in physics or chemistry. In 
other words, rational explanations follow this 
reductionist path and existential explanations 
are forgotten because the question is not 
accepted, the challenge is not accepted. The 
tragic question does not exist, we do not have a 
meaning. We are more of an animal that will die, 
and there are chance and chaos as unconscious 
models behind that, which ultimately means 
that there is a renunciation to address the 
major research problems of psychology. And 
this becomes almost a paradigm, because 
psychology continues being a slave to physics 
and chemistry; it thinks that, in order to 
continue being scientific, it should not go out 
from there. There is still a huge inferiority 
complex of human sciences and at the same 
time, an aexistencial, antiexistencial reaction 
of cowardice in the face of the challenge of the 
tragic. I apologize for the term cowardice: I am 
using it epistemically, without trying to judge 
intentions; I want to apply it not to people, 
but to the position towards science. Adopting 
such a position has to do not with personal 
virtues, but with the internalization of a way of 
understanding psychology, a way that I believe 
causes us harm.
Was Vygotsky an author who helped you orient 
yourself toward the existential questions?
Of course, one is guided by the authors 
that seem to address certain things in more 
depth. And that is the reason why Vygotsky, 
Unamuno, Zazzo and others inspired me. One 
is guided by the authors one intuits that are 
focused not only on the cognitive, intellectual 
problem, but also on the problem that we can call 
existential from the point of view of philosophy, 
or simply evolutive or evolutionary from the 
point of view of biology, of life sciences. It is 
a non-inert science that understands the great 
movements of the cosmos, and we are involved 
in these movements.
You have just mentioned evolutionism. How 
do you see evolutionism in Vygotsky’s work?
It is difficult. Vygotsky had an enormous 
intellectual appetite and therefore read about 
everything, from a wide variety of sources. 
First, he had a great education with tutors at 
home, a traditional literary humanist education 
and a very good philosophical, very Hegelian 
education. But in the end, his author was 
not Hegel. It was Spinoza. So in Vygotsky, 
there was on the one hand a large humanistic 
influence: art, drama, theater, poetry. On 
the other hand, there was another strong 
philosophical influence, which ultimately 
would be historical materialism and dialectical 
thought, the influence of Spinoza. And why do 
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I separate them? Because Spinoza enabled him 
to link to part of the artistic thought, which 
would be Calderón (an author he got to through 
Schopenhauer). But in Spinoza there is the 
problem of determinism and self-determination, 
which logically connects to the historical 
protagonism, i.e., the idea that “I can actually 
do something, I’m someone who can decide 
something; I am free first; so, if I’m free, I can 
determine my life and the course of history”. If 
we analyze this idea, it relates to the historical 
thought of Hegel, Marx and Engels. However, 
the connection sought by Vygotsky was not the 
one which traditional Marxists would generally 
establish, but a much more intimate connection 
with the problem of determinism.
These are the three best known 
influences and I always say that a fourth one 
has been forgotten, which is very evident when 
one reads The Historical Meaning of the Crisis 
in Psychology or Tool and Sign: the influence 
of ecofunctional thought. Vygotsky postulated 
the problem of consciousness and functions 
from the animal world. Animals are in the 
environment, and are prisoners of the present. 
How does a prisoner of the present living a 
concrete life become a free being, endowed with 
consciousness and able to circulate through the 
past, the present and the future? That interferes 
and transforms this world? Of course, the 
basic origin of mediation is in biology, in the 
ecofunctional model. And the affiliation between 
Vygotsky, biology and the ecofunctional thought 
has not been sufficiently examined.
But he does not follow that path much 
either. Once he developed his model, he was 
more concerned with another type of things 
– defectology, child development, higher 
functions, neurology – and he returned to the 
drama. The Vygotskian model of mediation, 
however, remains strong, as he secures it very 
well in biology.
In your opinion, is such strong theoretical 
framework in biology a limitation or an 
advantage?
An advantage. Many of the problems 
that we have in psychology in general or in the 
cultural-historical perspective with Vygotsky’s 
work are due to people forgetting that and 
reading Vygotsky in a rather mentalist way – 
the symbol, the sign, language. It is a mistake 
to read the language as if it were a world of 
thought which has nothing to do with biology. 
Sometimes I read articles from people of the 
current Evolutionary Psychology who work 
more on the natural functions and find a greater 
connection of thought and language with 
biology than the one that many Vygotskian 
or many historical-cultural psychologists find, 
which is worrying – not for them, but for us.
You state that the concept of mediation is related 
to the ecofunctional thought and that Vygotsky 
also has ties with the Marxist, Hegelian, and 
Aristotelian thoughts. So does he have these 
two roots, both in biology and in philosophy?
Yes. Like all of us, Vygotsky is the 
son of his time and, therefore, of intellectual 
heritages. Such intellectual heritages always 
have a bright side and a limited one, because 
no thought can be so good as to encompass 
everything. Then, he handled the heritages he 
received, and had to combine them, face them, 
resolve them. But the fact that Vygotsky is 
Russian, that his disciples developed their work 
in the Soviet Union, conditioned a lot how he 
was read. And, yes, he was a prisoner of that, 
indeed, a voluntary prisoner, because he was 
a convinced revolutionary who believed in 
historical thinking and dialectical thinking. But 
he did not believe it completely, and did not let 
himself be dragged by the Marxist regularity of 
the single line, of the lack of protagonism and 
relevance of individual life and liberty. Someone 
who thinks about Spinoza and Calderón can 
never accept the loss of liberty, much less of 
intellectual freedom.
It would be interesting if you please discuss the 
sometimes dogmatic and ideological readings 
525Educ. Pesqui., São Paulo, v. 39, n. 2, p. 509-540, abr./jun. 2013.
that people do of the Vygotskian legacy itself 
or of what is, in a sense, legitimized by the 
cultural-historical paradigm. How is the 
relationship between ideology and science 
established? 
To do science, it is necessary to free 
oneself from ideology. I remember that, when 
René Zazzo moderated the discussions in the 
laboratory and, to address a topic, someone 
invoked an ideological argument – he was a 
communist and everyone knew it, which caused 
a bit of complicity on the part of the left and 
the recourse to Marxist ideology as an authority 
argument – he got frantic: “We’re talking about 
science and here we don’t accept any arguments 
which are not scientifically grounded”.
It is terrific that being a Marxist makes 
one have a greater concern for social justice, 
for ensuring that child workers do not receive 
discriminatory treatment in their development. 
But, to analyze things scientifically, you 
cannot invoke an authority argument because 
of ideology. And this is happening because 
people are imposing one reading of Vygotsky 
as if there were a single Vygotsky legitimized 
by a historical materialist scientific orthodoxy, 
which implies a certain ideological authority 
argument, an implicit court (and let’s not forget 
that at the time there were explicit dictates 
and Vygotsky was censored).  We are all prone 
to this type of thought: making ideas clear, 
and finding a more orthodox Vygotsky than 
he really was. This is a misconception because 
Vygotsky is very contradictory at times. He 
overcomes some of his own a prioris and others 
he does not.  And he manages to break other a 
prioris of his time with great lucidity, such as 
the normalization of functions. Somehow, 
we build on inherited brain structures and, 
therefore, we are prisoners of these structures. 
In terms of neurology, that is what Luria 
called the pitcher theory or crystal theory: my 
experiences in my brain are structured on the 
neural networks that I have, and the networks 
that developed ontogenetically. So my pitcher 
is different from your pitcher. The fact that 
prior structures condition is something we must 
take into account. Sometimes during one’s life, 
one manages to break a prior structure and 
rebuild it, which is very difficult. Usually the 
new scientific generation does it: “Well, these 
people have done this by applying a very 
regular structure; it is necessary to break it and 
create a more powerful one”. 
We Vygotskians surely are prisoners 
of many of these structures. Vygotsky would 
have rejected deeply that the cultural-historical 
psychologists did Vygotskian psychology only 
and did not follow other lines of psychology, 
because he said that there is only one 
psychology. That is, if the cultural-historical 
model or the mediation model is powerful, it 
has to integrate into the rest of psychology, and 
the rest of psychology will have to recognize it 
and be integrated into it. 
This is a mirror problem: cognitivists 
think that nothing useful will ever come from 
Vygotskians, so they do not read them or do 
not know how to read them. This establishes 
a double rejection: when someone rejects you, 
you also reject him or her, and this leads to 
growing ignorance. This is happening and it is 
a tragedy, because cognitive psychology has 
many positive things, but they do not know 
and do not understand the model of higher 
functions, for example.
What you say applies not only to different 
schools and internal lines of psychology, 
but also to the dialogue of psychology with 
other fields of knowledge. That is something 
that Vygotsky did and we do not know how 
to do yet.
Yes. Faustino Cordón, another one of 
my professors was an ecofunctional biologist. 
I am not a biologist, but I learned a lot in a 
seminar with Cordón, who was working on the 
evolution of protoplasm and discovered the 
first enzyme. This is something that people did 
more in my youth and that they now do less 
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and less. I know many psychologists who say 
“I only work with the memory of propositions 
or autobiographical memory, and do not take 
me outside that”.  Scopes are highly reduced. 
And Cordón said: “There is only one science”. 
He is known for having worked on tetanus 
and developed drugs in the laboratory. That is, 
he worked with very basic feeding processes, 
enzymes and stuff. And he said the following: 
“In the end, feeding allowed me to understand 
the evolution of species. There is a close 
relationship between the concrete and broader 
themes. And if you do not go all this way, in 
fact, you will understand neither feeding (that 
you were examining at the concrete level), nor 
evolutionism”. 
In fact, this problem is not limited to psychology: 
it exists in the humanities in general. Currently, 
there are very interesting works by geneticists, 
sociologists, anthropologists and historians 
who analyze issues similar to the ones Vygotsky 
studied (such as the subject’s protagonism, 
non-subservience to social determinism, 
and the dialectical relationship with culture), 
which could help to advance the debate. Many 
researchers do not make these links and the 
few who dare make them are often considered 
insane. But in his time Vygotsky made them 
with great competence and constancy. In the 
contemporary world, what are the barriers for 
this necessary dialogue to take place and for 
other advances to occur in the field of science?
The debate on whether sciences have 
to open is very difficult today because we do 
not have time, we are in an obstacle course. 
It is more important to go fast than to go in 
the right direction, because people believe 
that an appropriate direction is any direction 
that produces patents and articles. There is a 
productivity mechanism according to which 
any race is valid, provided that it produces an 
object. Today there are many myths and this 
is one of the difficulties of science, because 
if you are working on a profound question, 
you cannot investigate it. The problem is that 
thought processes are long and medium-term, 
while the evaluation systems are short-term. So 
there is a mismatch between the mechanisms of 
measurement and the mechanisms of processes. 
There is a methodological reductionism. The 
methods of accountability count very badly 
but believe in their apparatus of counting, in 
their rule of measure. We live in a very painful 
and superstitious stage of science: people have 
mistaken the method for the methodology, 
the construct for the theory, the facts for the 
data. We have no time to talk, even among 
educators and among psychologists; talking 
with sociologists and biologists is even harder. 
And this has greatly impoverished research.
In the field of the cultural-historical 
perspective, the tradition of interdisciplinarity 
has also been present. When the Society for 
Sociocultural Research met in Madrid in 1992 
(then in Geneva in 1996, and in Campinas in 
2000), we tried to provoke an interdisciplinary 
dialogue and retrieve cultural historical thought 
in the progress made in the various disciplines, 
and very especially, in different cultures and in 
different languages. There was an orientation 
explicitly open to other currents. The idea was 
to disseminate the cultural-historical thought 
sharing it with other currents, perspectives and 
schools. We focused on redoing the agenda 
and seeing what the problems of the future 
would be. There was then another society: 
ISCRAT (International Society for Cultural 
Research and Activity Theory), in a trajectory 
more closely linked to the continuity of the 
cultural-historical thought developed in the 
former Soviet Union and Europe. Both merged 
into ISCAR (International Society for Cultural 
and Activity Research), which required an effort 
of dialogue so that the goals of continuity and 
openness converged.
Although my own personal circumstances 
have conditioned my activity and kept me 
somewhat away from conferences in recent 
years, which prevents me from having 
updated information, I am concerned that 
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the intercultural and interlinguistic – and 
perhaps the interdisciplinary – orientation 
has lost vitality. Perhaps we Vygotskians have 
converted ourselves into one more subject area, 
into a more self-limited parcel of the scientific 
community, also getting submerged, as everyone 
in the process of fragmentation, parceling and 
subordination of science. Perhaps as an effect of 
still focusing too much on a historical legacy, 
rather than on its shortcomings, we have 
succumbed to the limitations of conventional 
disciplinary parcels and their inability to face the 
great evolutionary and epistemological problems 
of human sciences.
Personally, I am concerned that the 
communities of researchers can collect and 
reissue today the challenges Vygotsky proposed 
to himself nearly a century ago: what is the 
human species and what are its cultures?; 
where have we come from, and above all 
where are we going, where can we go? How 
can the challenges of research on our historical 
evolution as a process that is open and partly 
accessible to our capacity for self-determination 
and design defy all science, including in it the 
Vygotskian legacy?
Shall we talk a little about the implications 
of your field of research and study for 
education? Was it you who developed the 
notion of cultural developmental milestones?
I developed this notion with Amelia 
Alvarez (1996). Although we have known and 
worked with Urie Bronfenbrenner, the idea only 
partially corresponds to the systems postulated 
by him. The concept of milestone is a little 
more linked, on the one hand, to the traditional 
models of ecofunctionalism and, on the other, to 
the Vygotskian study of mediation mechanisms 
in cultures. I believe Bronfenbrenner sought 
to make an orderly description, a categorical 
description of contexts of development, 
which partly satisfies the current efforts of 
evolutionary psychology, considering what the 
word context – the most used one – implies as 
conditioning of child development. Furthermore, 
the term development contexts denotes a too 
circumstantial focus because it is secondary. Our 
concern is directed to a more functional analysis 
of the culture in which children develop, because 
we understand them as immersed not only in 
one context or another, but in an extracortical 
network of functions which are shared 
and embedded in culture.
This concept is very interesting and so is 
the way you see change, socio-historical 
evolution, unsettled evolution, fragmentation, 
that is, your psychoecolgical approach.
For me, the models of exosystem or 
macrosystem, albeit acceptable in terms of abstract 
description, have always struck me as somewhat 
undefined at the time of intervention, when 
you need to make drawings and performances 
on activities and functions more related to the 
psychologist’s traditional instruments (diagnostic 
evidence and mediation tools for reeducation 
or development). Sometimes valid concepts as 
explanatory or explanatory categories are not 
operational, operative in diagnosis or drawing. 
This happens with Liontev’s trio: activity, action 
and operation.
When I teach activity to students, I 
use Leontiev and the example of writing a 
love letter. In this case, pressing a key is the 
operation, typing is the action and writing a 
love letter is the activity. And they understand 
the activity system perfectly. Leontiev’s model 
is beautiful and works very well when you 
explain it. When I try to see it in the daily 
life of pre-school children or in the lives of 
indigenous people, I begin to have problems, 
because it occurs with it the same that happens 
to concepts in general: every concept can be 
the attribute of another concept. In turn, every 
attribute is a concept and every concept can 
be the attribute of a concept. Therefore, every 
activity can be the action of another activity 
and every operation can be an activity by itself, 
because once I have transferred the meaning 
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and emotions to a particular action, that action 
becomes an activity. Therefore, models are 
useful for analyzing and understanding, but 
you must take care when you convert them into 
universal theoretical models.
In the Soviet debate, they were hard 
pressed by the need for orthodoxy, to have 
a settled model, because all political models 
have the habit of classifying the world into 
good and evil, into accepted and not accepted, 
which was very harmful even to Leontiev 
himself. Leontiev is a great psychologist, a 
very intelligent person, but he was a prisoner 
of the obligation to provide the political 
regime with clear references, of having to 
build an orthodox psychology accepted by 
the regime. And this always distorts things. 
Now we are researching the cultural diets, the 
imaginary and the media, and we do not wish 
to describe them as exosystems, although this 
was expected, since we apply Bronfenbrenner’s 
taxonomy. In this sense, models, especially 
the hierarchical and classificatory ones, are 
initially very useful and operate as crutches 
that allow approaching problems, but one must 
be very careful. Paper allows wrapping up the 
gift, but it is necessary to see that the paper is 
not the structure: it is the wrapper, something 
that allows me to handle the gift. In this sense, I 
am very cautious, for example, with the activity 
theme. Criticizing Leontiev became possible 
during the Perestroika, when there could be a 
debate on the orthodox model of activity, when 
Jaroshevsky and others postulated what is what 
in the dialectical model of analysis. I cannot, 
for example, convert the object of analysis, 
which is activity, into an explanatory object 
of the activity. That is, nothing can be the 
means and the end simultaneously. The means 
to explain the activity is mediation. Therefore, 
the explanatory principle is mediation and 
the object is the activity. Leontiev fell for this 
because he was under a lot of pressure from the 
context in which he lived.
I think that, to be loyal to the cultural-
historical perspective, one should treat it in an 
unorthodox way, but in a critical or even 
rebellious way. One must free oneself a little 
from certain constraints that the very history of 
cultural-historical perspective has created. And 
to me the activity continues being a key concept. 
I speak of activity from ecofunctionalism, 
not from the cultural-historical theory. Why? 
Because activity was a central concept before 
the cultural-historical theory, and will remain so. 
Therefore, it is important to avoid sacred words.
I am concerned that there is an orthodoxy in 
the cultural-historical perspective and I think 
this is a problem that involves freedom. Among 
researchers who rely on this paradigm, I believe 
there is a line more open to other subjects and 
currents of psychology and another line trying 
to work within a perfectly defined and self-
sufficient theoretical model. It is in this sense 
that I recollected the initial objectives of the 
SSCR (Society for Sociocultural Research), that 
is, returning to the sources, the issues which 
Vygotsky proposed and which humanity – and 
psychology, as their assistant science – have 
proposed today. In other words, what are the 
problems of human beings that we should 
continue investigating at the moment? In what 
way? And what social and cultural problems 
need addressing? I believe this could be the 
future development of such perspective.
You raised the question of meaning. Thinking 
about the units of analysis proposed by 
Vygotsky to explain the psychological 
functioning – mediated action, word, meaning, 
sense – is it possible to examine the activity 
from the viewpoint of sense?
Yes. He was accused of being 
inconsistent because he did not have the same 
unit of analysis, the same object of analysis. 
But we all have to be free, and so was he. Now 
I am interested in the sense just as he begins 
to address it in The Psychology of Art; then, 
when he was studying the first step of semiotic 
mediation, comes the sign in examples such as 
the bone, vestigial functions, the ring moved 
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from one hand to the other or the handkerchief. 
When analyzing semiotic mediation in the 
second step, he deals with the meaning and 
soon goes back to the sense, at the end of the 
last chapter of Thought and Language. In fact, 
mediation is on the agenda all the time. What 
happens is that he addresses different levels 
of mediation. When Vygotsky discusses the 
meaning, there is a passage in which he says 
something like this: “In the beginning, I was 
interested in the reference role, what the sign 
replaced, the thing. I was therefore interested 
in the external meaning, but now it does not 
interest me. That is, I am interested in what 
the vision of the situation generates in the 
mind and the attitude in the face of an action, 
the ideas, the feelings”. This is what he called 
phasic level before the semantic level. With 
that, he returns to the sense, but it is not the 
sense present at the beginning of The The 
Psychology of Art; ten years later, Vygotsky has 
a mediational architecture on which the sense 
can be sustained.
Akhutina and Luria postulated that, 
deep down, he never came out of that same 
axis of mediation, but he gradually focused 
on different aspects, and thus had to change 
the object of analysis to bring such process to 
light. That is, the object of analysis is precisely 
different aspects of mediation. Actually, if we 
have sense, sign, meaning and sense, there is 
not much change. But some of the debates have 
been very scholastic, assuming a unique and 
timeless Vygotskian legacy – and not a process 
with several transformations – and intending to 
find a complete and univocal articulated model. 
I agree with Akhutina and Luria that Vygotsky 
was consistent in this transition. He was doing 
not contradictory things, but consecutive 
things, which allowed him to approach the 
problem in different layers of solution or 
approach: at a moment, Vygotsky unveils the 
role of mediation, roughly speaking, of art; 
at another moment, he takes into account 
the sign, operators; then the operators are no 
longer artifact-object operators but operators 
of meaning – it is the concept; and finally it 
is no longer the concept that is at issue, but 
again the sense, now formulated on the basis 
of concepts and no longer of the initial sense 
– love, death. One must understand, therefore, 
how Vygotsky peels off his onion. He used to 
write straight with crooked lines his model of 
cultural evolution, mediation, construction 
of this sense, of this world, of this drama in 
mind, and he showed with what elements he 
gradually built it. Sometimes the elements 
stand, and sometimes they fall because he was 
mistaken, he had forced something. But the 
model stands: although he did not see his path 
well, he made his way as he could, just as we 
all do. Therefore, it is very important to capture 
the sense in Vygotsky, rather than the meaning. 
Are the debates on orthodoxy debates on 
meaning? Conviction about a theoretical model 
is a problem of sense, and it is at the level of 
sense that I consider myself a Vygotskian. I do 
not consider myself linked to any of the specific 
proposals in terms of meaning, that is, I have 
not signed an orthodoxy or a blank check.
Beyond dogmatism and the lack of openness 
to interdisciplinary dialogue, today research 
conditions do not favor the development of 
longitudinal studies (like those on memory 
that Luria developed following subjects for 
decades). Are the challenges imposed to 
construct research programs that allow us to 
study the human condition bigger these days?
In this sense, as for interdisciplinary 
dialogue, dialogue within the Vygotskian 
perspective and openness of science, we must 
open many windows, many doors. The stage of 
dissemination is over and the people interested 
in the perspective already have enough texts 
and forums to get acquainted with it. More than 
working with ready ideas, what we seek is to 
resume the points of conflict in the cultural-
historical thought, in which there is a promise, 
but there are also obstacles, problems. In other 
words, the Vygotskian perspective has to get lost 
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to find itself, has to learn to open the door. In 
that sense, what you have mentioned is correct, 
i.e., there is an excessive fear of talking with the 
others. Of course this is also due to the others’ 
prejudices against talking with us. There has 
always been prejudice, and we all have to make 
efforts. We need to regain dialectical vitality, 
cultural vitality, the vitality of an investigator 
with historical consciousness. And that takes 
us to long-term investigations. The entire 
apparatus of the current academic research is 
fostering short and medium-term investigations 
and requiring short-term productivity. This is 
ominous. It may make sense in areas in which 
science is subjected to technology, as in the 
programs of drug development or explanation 
of a gene, in which one works with an agenda 
much more marked by industrial productivity. 
Science and efficacy have different times, but 
we can understand.
Now, in social processes that, by 
definition, are medium and long term, 
technology has to be submitted to science. For 
example, the cultural-historical or cultural-
genetic activity on rising generations is 
generational. So we are talking about average 
cycles of 10, 15, 20 years. The ontogeny of a 
child consists of cycles of 3, 5, 10 years. The 
processes of cultural influence of what may 
be called the natural history of culture, of the 
effects of television and literature on science 
itself, which also applies to content analysis 
to see how scientific ideas can diffuse or not, 
are medium and long-term cycles. In social 
processes, we have the advantage that, as there 
is no industry, nothing rushes us. But they do 
not give us money for it either. Yet they have 
applied to us the short-term expectation. 
Indeed, Luria did tremendously important 
investigations for many years on the mind of a 
mnemonist and also on a man who lost his memory 
and whose world was thus destroyed. There is a 
work by Umberto Eco (The Mysterious Flame of 
Queen Loana) in which the protagonist does not 
know who he is and starts to read the books and 
comics from his childhood to try to understand how 
he became himself, making his way backwards. It 
is a wonderful novel, beautifully constructed from 
some autobiographical memories and memories 
of the culture of the author’s time. Eco makes a 
kind of literary inquiry, while Luria presents a 
scientific inquiry into the culture of an entire era. 
I greatly admire doctors because they manage to 
do wonderful investigations, because if they have 
a patient for 15 years, they have a loyalty to the 
individual which after all is a loyalty to the topic. 
Oliver Sacks is also an investigator of single cases 
and can reach the depths. This has been lost in 
research. I worry a lot with the construction of the 
imagery and narratives. To study them, we need to 
make very long and massive investigations. Today 
researchers are under great pressure to perform 
projects in a short period of time, preferably 
on topics in vogue (which generally offer more 
possibility of funding for research). Thus, many 
end up having a fragmented and reductionist 
agenda, which makes it very difficult to track the 
important questions.
To work around this situation, researchers 
devote themselves to doing unofficial 
investigations and use the time of their nights 
and vacations. They have to maintain the 
continuity in spite of the system, because it 
has lost orientation, it is fragmented due to 
effectiveness and does not know where to go. In 
Spain, we have increased scientific productivity 
because there have been many more articles 
indexed in high impact journals. But does this 
really mean that we are investigating more, 
doing more research and finding out more? In a 
study led by Amelia Álvarez with directors and 
evaluators of scientific journals, several of them 
pointed to the existence of much empirical stuff, 
i.e., articles that have all the measurements of 
the apparatus of accountability, productivity, 
but contributed virtually nothing to research. 
And the vast majority of the studies published 
are like that. Politicians claim to measure 
immediately with simple tools what can only be 
measured in a long process and with complex 
instruments. I remember that when I was a 
member of research committees, the guidelines 
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for evaluating projects and researchers sought 
to ensure that they would discover something 
new and relevant, but at the same time to 
ensure that the investigator was updated and 
followed the authors who had made the most 
recent advances in the subject. Ultimately, what 
they ask is the assurance that the work assessed 
has approved exactly what already exists, so 
that nothing new comes out of there.
No doubt, we live a very bleak moment, and 
this whole situation has probably affected 
your production. You have a long and 
relevant academic career. Could you please 
tell us what the way out of this state of 
affairs is – if there is one?
I do not think my career is relevant. I 
want to believe that my quest and my intuitions 
are so, but my empirical investigations 
have been greatly affected by all sorts of 
conditionings. Many of those conditionings are 
the result of my own choices and limitations, 
while others may be due to institutional 
constraints and deformations. In general, 
I have been sensitized and affected by the 
institutional machinery, which is largely our 
own collective responsibility, the academics’ 
responsibility. For example, when I began to 
investigate the external brain – which is what 
I perceive as the most relevant in my search – 
and submitted the project of what we might call 
exoneuropsychology from the perspective of the 
model of functions distributed outside the mind, 
it was rejected. I was evaluated three times in 
a row. I heard that, when the director of the 
evaluation institution saw the rejection and the 
project, he wondered: “How could they reject 
it?” It seemed to him that the rejection was not 
consistent; he resubmitted the project twice to 
two other evaluators and they rejected it again. 
Of course, the currents of neuropsychology in 
Spain are very conventional: they do not accept 
neurogenesis and do not accept extracorticality.
It is not easy to make research in 
neuropsychology feasible without resources. 
Topics such as neurogenesis, on which I wanted 
to seek empirical evidence, are very difficult to 
investigate if you do not have resources and 
access to hospitals. Also when we postulated 
the cultural construction or destruction of 
attention, the project was rejected again. They 
argued: “How will we argue that attention is 
not an innate process? There is no evidence of 
that”. It is not true that there is no evidence. 
All the arguments of the evaluators were quite 
debatable because the evidence accumulates in 
the other direction. I counter-argued, but they 
did not fund the project.
In Spain, although we have managed to 
homologate certain healthy procedures, there 
is always sectarianism: a behaviorist rejects a 
Freudian, a Freudian rejects a behaviorist, a 
behaviorist and a Freudian reject a cognitivist, 
and vice versa. As far as I could and knew, 
whenever I evaluated, I took care not to be 
influenced by the work done from the point 
of view of a particular orientation. But I must 
say that, in the evaluations of many colleagues, 
I saw epistemic, methodological, and even 
institutional and ideological positions operating. 
When someone is working productively and 
legitimately, whatever the perspective, this 
matters a lot. No one is vaccinated against 
sectarianism, and the claim that there is only 
a ruler to measure is now as dangerous as the 
Marxist orthodoxy was to Vygotsky. At the 
moment, we live in a free and democratic world. 
But is there complete freedom in academia? I do 
not think so. We have been unable to eliminate 
historically constructed prejudices and they 
will continue to accompany us for many years.
In this sense, we must constantly 
struggle for the freedom to investigate what you 
believe is necessary to investigate. I continued 
interested in neurogenesis and in the cultural 
processes of construction and deconstruction 
of attention, doing what I could. Clearly, I lack 
the means, but I think it would be worse to 
accept the price of conditioned resources. The 
current generations of researchers in Spain 
face a scenario like this: they keep jumping 
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a series of obstacles and passing through a 
series of narrowings. Once you accept this 
game, you are imprisoned in a very narrow 
way. A part of the new generations has agreed 
to pay the price of the academic career and 
is very constrained by this kind of issues. We 
need to regain freedom. And sometimes you 
pay a price for it, which is the price of the 
struggle, of being discriminated against and 
having fewer resources. But what you cannot 
afford is the internal price of renouncing your 
themes, hypotheses and ideas.
Finally, could you please talk a little about 
your studies related to neurogenesis, an 
extremely interesting topic to which you have 
dedicated yourself for a long time?
Somehow, we are all fed and strengthened 
by the a prioris of the mentality and the 
paradigms of our time, and yet we are their 
prisoners. The blessing and the curse of human 
beings come with their culture, whereas the 
blessing and the curse of scientists come with 
the knowledge they inherit. The role of science 
is to receive the inheritance, but to overcome 
its a prioris. To overcome them, however, it is 
necessary to start from them.
The a priori that excluded and that 
stopped the neurogenesis hypothesis is that the 
brain is an artifact, a stable organ: in phylogeny 
we have reached brain, cortical development, 
and a stability was produced; in individual 
contingencies, there is neuronal damage, but 
there is not a new neuronal growth, i.e., there 
are new synapses, but there is no neurogenesis. 
And all metaphors are of the following type: the 
brain resembles the computer and, thus, it has 
hardware and software. Such a prioris generate 
a thought that conditions our ideas about 
development. The very development of the 
cultural-historical perspective is a prisoner of 
the hypothesis of non-neurogenesis, established 
in medicine, neurology and psychology since 
Cajal’s histology, since the early years of the 
twentieth century.
In his last writings on brain structure, 
when he was studying medicine, Vygotsky 
intuited that there are brain changes. He did 
not present the idea explicitly, because he 
had no time to do the second formulation 
after the model of higher functions. These are 
culturally constructed through mediation, and 
Vygotsky coined two concepts to account for 
this, although they do not actually explain 
the process: appropriation and interiorization. 
When an external operation – such as the 
multiplication table, the sight that works with 
the image or the external look – turns into an 
inward operation, there is a passage process. 
The Russian term for interiorization means 
many things – interiorization, revolution, 
reconstruction – but it has always been 
translated as internalization, which makes it 
appear that you take inside what is outside. 
This is a more complex concept, but in any case 
a cyclic external operation becomes internal. 
In this process, does something happen to the 
brain? This is the question that Vygotsky asked 
himself in his last two years, when the brain 
was his study subject. And he thought that if the 
cultural-historical theory fails to demonstrate 
what happens in the brain, it is more of a theory 
of mental character. This would lead therefore 
to the dualism, the separation between body 
and mind. He did not coin the concept of 
neurogenesis, but he began to approach it.
Hence also the explanation about 
growth in layers and deterioration, which has 
remained throughout the neuropsychology of 
recovery and was developed by Luria’s school: 
the hypothesis that the construction of new 
cortical layers has a logic in the constitution 
of higher functions: depending on whether 
lesions are in the deep layers or in the external 
layers, the consequences on the performance of 
a higher function are distinct. Therefore, this 
hypothesis assumes that there is neurogenesis. 
And Luria was very loyal to Vygotsky in terms 
of authorship concerning the hypothesis of 
brain growth. Based on this, Luria and many 
of his contributors worked with the idea that 
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higher functions imply brain growth, the 
emergence of new cortical areas, something 
that has been demonstrated. And for them, 
these areas are not characterized by traditional 
localizationism, but by a development of 
mechanisms. What we call operators of 
instrumental mediation – the abacus, for 
example – in Luria’s neuropsychology became 
neurological mechanisms. Such mechanisms 
have locations and can be traced in neurology 
and neuropsychology works, but basically 
are integrated into very articulate systems. 
Vygotsky also said this already: functions 
usually reverberate throughout much of the 
brain, and not in a single place.
This whole brain architecture in which 
Vygotsky advanced in Luria led to the evidence 
of neurogenesis. However, these are Soviet 
studies that are disseminated only in the West. 
As far as I know of Luria’s work, I am sure 
that neurogenesis exists and that this is the 
only way. The evidence on neurogenesis has 
accumulated over the past five years. There is 
research on how new cortical areas appear in 
Buddhist monks after ten years of meditation or 
in the famous London taxi drivers after years of 
practicing their profession.
Can we assert that neurogenesis has been 
consolidated as a field of study? Could you 
please comment on the latest research on 
the subject?
Neurologists and biologists are doing 
research on neurogenesis. Bauer and Altman 
demonstrated neurogenesis in animals in the 
1970s, but their publications were not taken 
seriously until the 1990s. At the moment, 
Altman is already recognized as a historical 
figure in the development of neurology. So far, 
there are two things: neurogenesis is a natural 
mechanism in animals, whose brain is mutating. 
If we add this to what Bruner calls phylogenetic 
immaturity, based on the investigation by De 
Vore about prematurity in human childbirth 
in the phylogenetic process or phylogenetic 
miscarriage, it is possible to understand that 
Vygotsky was right and that most of the brain 
growth after childbirth is neurogenetic, caused 
by the incorporation of higher functions. In 
other words, much of our neurogenesis is not 
the result of a purely natural system, but of a 
combined system of biological development 
mediated by culture.
We distinguish three memory systems. 
The first two are the genetic system (genome), 
which influences the conformation of the 
brain, and the nervous system, by means of 
which the brain incorporates knowledge. When 
the organism dies, the knowledge provided by 
the second of these systems disappears, but 
the genome continues. Thus, both systems 
complement each other: one of them (the 
brain) is very flexible and the other is very 
rigid; one is very stable and the other is very 
unstable. These two systems work very well, but 
Vygotsky points to the existence of a third one: 
culture, which performs social and instrumental 
mediations. Indeed, from the functional 
and psychological point of view, there are 
functions that are performed in culture. And 
if neurogenesis is right, such a system is 
incorporated into the second, working from the 
outside and restructuring the cortical system.
This piece of news is tremendously 
important because it implies that the system 
of human evolution consists of three parts 
and the brain actively responds to both the 
requirements of the genome and those of 
culture (of culturome, we might say, to establish 
a terminological equivalence). These are not 
three shares in parallel, but three parts which 
interact. The interaction between the second 
system and the first one today is a fascinating 
and very complex topic with which biology 
is still struggling. Research is underway and 
will still be for a long time. But the relations 
between the second and the third system are 
the ones that have opened the way for the last 
five or ten years.
Neurogenesis has become evident, not 
just to Luria’s school, but also to the West. Yet, 
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most of the people who work on neuroscience 
lack the key to the distinction between natural 
function and higher function as well as the key 
to understanding how neurogenesis is related 
to such distinction and that many of the human 
neurogeneses   (not all, obviously, because there 
are still neurogeneses of natural functions, 
so to speak, of animal character – when you 
receive a new leg, you can reconstruct the 
movement) are related to higher functions, 
i.e., they are culturally activated neurogeneses. 
This is the line we are in, without the necessary 
resources.  I must say that we remain exploring 
the terrain, rather than doing an effective job. 
In any case, we try to understand the functions 
distributed externally and make a diagnosis of 
them, since the functional research has focused 
almost exclusively on internally corticalized 
functions. Thus, our intention is to objectify 
the externalized functions and the interactions 
between the internal and external functions.
As you can see, the relation between the 
study of external neuropsychology and internal 
neuropsychology is the most direct development 
to be implemented from Vygotsky’s theoretical 
proposal, taken globally. It is to map and 
articulate, in every individual and in every culture, 
the functional tissues distributed externally 
and internally. In both cases, the process is 
evolutionary: culture changes and so does the 
brain. So for us, there is not much distance 
between cultural psychology, as proposed by 
Cole, and neuropsychology, as proposed by Luria 
in his last work of vital reflection (1979).
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